Eliminating Proximate Cause as an Element of the Prima Facie Case for Student Products Liability by Zablotsky, Peter
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 1 Fall 1995 Article 3 
1995 
Eliminating Proximate Cause as an Element of the Prima Facie 
Case for Student Products Liability 
Peter Zablotsky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Peter Zablotsky, Eliminating Proximate Cause as an Element of the Prima Facie Case for Student 
Products Liability, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 31 (1996). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol45/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ELIMINATING PROXIMATE CAUSE AS AN
ELEMENT OF THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
FOR STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Peter Zablotsky*
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts articulates the ba-
sic principles of the strict products liability cause of action.' It is a signifi-
cant section; perhaps more than any other section ever drafted, it has
come to be regarded as critical black letter law.2 Section 402A is cur-
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assistance with research.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This section states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought-the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
2. See, e.g., Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 188 N.W.2d 426, 433 (Minn.
1971) (holding that circumstantial evidence is a sufficient basis for a finding of strict liabil-
ity); Cochran v. Brooke, 409 P.2d 904, 906 (Or. 1966) ("It has been said that the adoption
of this section is one of the most spectacular developments of tort law in this century.");
Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966) ("We hereby adopt the foregoing language [of
§ 402A] as the law of Pennsylvania."); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 263
(R.I. 1971) (adopting § 402A in Rhode Island); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, 416 S.W.2d
787, 789 (Tex. 1967) (adopting § 402A in Texas). See also James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1992) ("Only rarely do provisions of the American
Law Institute's Restatements of the Law rise to the dignity of holy writ .... [S]ection 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is such a provision."); William L. Prosser, The Fall of
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 793 n.9, 794-97 (1966)
(discussing the states' rapid embrace of strict liability without privity of contract as re-
flected in § 402A); Note, Products Liability and Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts,
55 GEO. L.J. 286, 287 (1966) ("[S]ection 402A will have a substantial impact on the future
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rently being revised.3 The occasion of revision has provided the opportu-
nity for a broad and often bitter debate over the exact form of the strict
products liability cause of action.4 Critical to this debate is the underlying
theory-of-liability issue, i.e., whether the cause of action for products lia-
bility ought to lie in strict liability or negligence.5 The resolution of this
of products liability. An understanding of this section is therefore increasingly imperative
for the practicing attorney and the courts.").
3. A final vote on the revision has been scheduled for 1995. The debate concerns the
exact form of the strict products liability cause of action. As of this writing, the following
draft revisions of § 402A have been published by the American Law Institute: RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Preliminary
Draft]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (Council Draft No. 1, 1993) [hereinafter
Council Draft No. 1]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (Council Draft No. 1A,
1994) [hereinafter Council Draft No. 1A]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A (Ten-
tative Draft No. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 1]; Restatement (Third) of Torts
§ 402A (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 2].
4. See, e.g., Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters' Study of Enterprise Respon-
sibility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241, 241 (1993) (criticizing the Report-
ers' recommendations for revisions to § 402A); John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the
A.L.I. Erode Strict Liability in the Restatement (Third) for Products Liability?, 10 TOURO
L. REV. 21 (1993) (anticipating considerable disagreement over the Reporters' proposed
revisions of § 402A); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 1513 (proposing their own
unofficial draft revisions to § 402A and noting that the two authors were appointed as
Reporters for the revision of the section); Peter N. Swisher, Products Liability Tort Re-
form: Why Virginia Should Adopt the Henderson-Twerski Proposed Revision of Section
402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 857, 858, 858 n.6 (1993) (urging
Virginia to recognize a strict liability remedy in tort action modeled after Professors Hen-
derson and Twerski's proposed revisions to § 402A).
5. Requirements of a prima facie case for negligent product liability include: a
breach of duty on the part of the manufacturer or seller toward the person complaining of
the defect; an injury to the person whom that duty is owed proximately caused by the
breach of duty on the part of the seller/manufacturer; that the product was defective; and
that the seller/manufacturer's acts or omissions regarding the product was causally related
to the harm. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963, 969 n.3 (Ala. 1985)
(quoting David G. Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on Plaintiffs Conduct, 1968
UTAH L. REV. 267, 270). Epstein stated that: "The basic elements of negligence in a prod-
ucts liability case are the same as those in any tort litigation: duty, breach of duty, cause in
fact, proximate or legal cause, and damages." Id.; see also Stanley Indus. v. W.M. Barr &
Co., 784 F. Supp. 1570, 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("A prima facie case of products liability
negligence, similar to an action for common law negligence, requires some evidence that
the defendant breached a duty which actually and proximately caused plaintiff's injury.");
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440,440-43 (N.Y. 1980)
(holding that a manufacturer may not be held liable for defects caused by subsequent mod-
ifications to the product that were beyond the manufacturer's control). The prima facie
case for strict products liability include the following: the defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous condition of the product and a causal connection (cause in fact and proximate
cause) between the defect and the plaintiff's injuries. Additionally, plaintiff must show that
the defect existed at the time that the product left manufacturer/seller's control and that it
reached the user or consumer substantially unchanged. See Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1962) (ruling that "[A] manufacturer is strictly liable in
tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspec-
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theory-of-liability issue hinges upon two major sub-issues: (1) the extent
to which the risk-benefit test is used as a means of determining whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous;6 and (2) the relationship between
strict liability and proximate cause.7 This Article focuses on the second
issue.
It is the thesis of this Article that proximate cause should not be in-
cluded as an element of a strict products liability cause of action. At first,
this thesis may appear contrary to the fundamental doctrine that liability
must be limited to foreseeable harm. Further explanation, however,
demonstrates that other elements of the products liability cause of action
already limit liability. The strict products liability cause of action neces-
sarily excludes proximate cause as a separate element of proof.
This Article first discusses the background surrounding the efforts to
redraft section 402A. Next, this Article discusses historical and theoreti-
cal points about proximate cause that illustrate the difficulty of including
the doctrine as an element of the strict products liability cause of action.
Then, this Article analyzes how the courts, legislatures, and section 402A
have dealt with proximate cause in the strict products liability context.
Finally, this Article suggests that the exclusion of the proximate cause
tion for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being"). In Giglio v.
Connecticut Light & Power Co., 429 A.2d 486, 488 (Conn. 1980), the court declared:
In order to recover under the doctrine of strict liability in tort the plaintiff must
prove that: (1) the defendant was engaged in the business of selling the product;
(2) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the con-
sumer or user; (3) the defect caused the injury for which compensation was
sought; (4) the defect existed at the time of the sale; and (5) the product was
expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in condition.
Id. Furthermore, in Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1272 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974), the court explained:
[The plaintiff] must prove that: 1) the product in question was defective; 2) the
defect existed at the time the products left the hands of the defendant; 3) that
because of the defect the product was unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer (plaintiff); 4) that the consumer was injured or suffered damages; 5)
and that the defect (if proved) was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered.
Id. (quoting Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W. 2d 863, 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)).
6. See infra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the risk-benefit test in greater
detail).
7. Proximate cause is a statement of policy whereby the courts can place limitations
upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct. See W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (5th ed. 1984). "[Llegal
responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the re-
sult . . . that the law is justified in imposing liability." Id. Cause in fact deals with the
physical connection between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's injury. Id. Plaintiff
must show that the defendant caused the harm that was the but for cause of plaintiff's
injury. Id.
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requirement is the only viable way of preserving a products liability cause
of action grounded in strict liability.
I. EARLY VIEWS, THE HISTORY OF LIABILITY, AND THE PARAMETERS
OF THE CURRENT DEBATE
For the second time in its young life, the strict products liability cause
of action is entering a critical phase, with the American Law Institute's
(A.L.I.) Restatement of Torts again playing an important role. The first
critical phase occurred during the early 1960s, when the A.L.I. drafted,
debated, and ultimately published section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.8 This section charts the birth and infancy of the strict prod-
ucts liability cause of action.
9
A turbulent period of development saw a basic consensus emerge on
certain fundamental points, such as the need for separate causes of
action for manufacturing defect and design defect. 10 Other issues,
8. Section 402A was drafted by the A.L.I. to assist consumers in recovering claims
against manufacturers for defective products. The section established a cause of action
under a theory of strict liability, which did not require proof of the manufacturer's fault. It
also enabled a consumer to pursue this theory without privity of contract, which was re-
quired under the warranty theory. See, e.g., Oscar S. Gray, Reflections On The Historical
Context Of Section 402A, 10 ToURO L. REV. 75, 85-87 (1993) (noting that § 402A was
drafted to make clear that a manufacturer could be held strictly liable, even without a
finding of fault, for products causing harm because of unmerchantable qualities); Hender-
son & TWerski, supra note 2, at 1515 ("In the early 1960s, American courts came to recog-
nize that a seller of any product containing a manufacturing defect should be liable in tort
for harm caused by the defect regardless of the plaintiff's ability to maintain a traditional
negligence or warranty action."); Prosser, supra note 2, at 791-97 (noting how rapidly the
states recognized strict liability without negligence in the wake of bedrock cases in the
early 1960s); Aaron Twerski, From a Reporter's Perspective: A Proposed Agenda, 10
TOURO L. REV. 5, 9-11 (1993) (noting that § 402A sought to eliminate privity from prod-
ucts liability law).
9. Twerski, supra note 8, at 9-11.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra
note 7, at §§ 95-96 (discussing two types of product conditions that can result in loss to a
purchaser); Sheila L. Birnbaum and Barbara Wrubel, "State of the Art" and Strict Products
Liability, 21 TORT AND INS. L.J. 30, 30 (1985) ("Traditionally, three categories of product
defect have been recognized as providing a basis for the imposition of liability upon manu-
facturers and sellers: defect in manufacture, defect in design, and defect by reason of the
absence or inadequacy of a warning."); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design
Defect.- From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV.
593, 599-600 (1980) (discussing the problems of applying the defect concept to the two
distinct factual situations that characterize manufacturing and design defect cases); John L.
Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Products Liability Theory, 34 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 529, 534-35 (1982) (stating that determining what is a design defect has proven
difficult); David A. Fischer, Products Liability - The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV.
339, 343 (1974) (contrasting manufacturing defect with "unavoidably unsafe" product de-
fect and proposing to include different standards of liability for manufacturing and design,
and warning defects, in revisions to § 402A); Id. at 340-42 (noting that § 402A distin-
1995] Strict Products Liability
however, have remained unresolved for decades. Contrasting views
abound regarding whether separate actions ought to exist for design de-
fect and failure-to-warn," the appropriate use of the consumer
expectation and risk-benefit tests,12 the appropriate role of plaintiff
misuse,' 3 and the appropriate use of expert testimony. 14 Most recently,
guishes between manufacturing and design defect through its definition of defect); Hender-
son & Twerski, supra note 2, at 1514-16 (proposing to include different standards of
liability for manufacturing, design, and warning defects in revisions to § 402A); Twerski,
supra note 8, at 10 n.22 (defining manufacturing defect as "an abnormality or a condition
that was unintended, and makes the product more dangerous than it would have been as
intended").
11. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 1532-33 (advocating the use of a
reasonableness standard for liability in design defect and failure-to-warn cases); Dix W.
Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw. L.J. 256,
260-61 (1969) (noting that plaintiffs often pursue failure-to-warn claims because juries are
better able to understand and detect the need for better product directions and warnings
than to identify a technical flaw in a product's design); Aaron D. Twerski et al., The Use
and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 495, 501 & n.22 (1976) (contending that the courts' tendency to consider
both design defect and failure-to-warn grounds for strict products liability is tantamount to
a very thorough consideration of design defect); Phillips, supra note 4, at 246-48 (criticizing
the Reporters' attempt to articulate bright line standards for failure-to-warn claims).
12. See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 1532-34 (arguing that consumer
expectations are one factor to consider in undertaking a "risk-utility" analysis); TWerski,
supra note 8, at 13-14 (arguing that design defect cases are best analyzed using the "risk-
utility" rather than the "consumer expectation" test); W. Page Keeton, The Meaning of
Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 588-
96 (1980) (advocating abandonment of the "consumer expectation test" and adoption of
the "risk-utility" test).
13. See, e.g., Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Iowa 1980) (rejecting
plaintiff misuse as an affirmative defense and noting that the issue will be considered in
connection with the plaintiff's burden of proving an "unreasonably dangerous condition"
and causation); cf. Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 355 (Md. 1985) (de-
claring that plaintiff misuse may bar recovery where it is the sole proximate cause or the
intervening superseding cause); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 21 (Md. 1975) (declar-
ing that plaintiff misuse may bar a recovery if plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence);
Peter Zablotsky, The Appropriate Role of Plaintiff Misuse of Products Liability Causes of
Action, 10 ToURo L. REV. 183, 209 (1993) (arguing that the Restatement should adopt the
majority view that plaintiff misuse should be treated as an affirmative defense).
14. See, e.g., Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39
VAND. L. REV. 577, 578 (1986) (exploring the issues associated with the proliferation of
expert testimony in modern litigation under Federal Rule of Evidence 703); William A.
Donaher et al., The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV.
1303 (1974) (arguing that "[i]n strict products liability litigation the role of the technologist
is pivotal"); Barry M. Epstein and Marc S. Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony
in Product Liability Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 656, 656 (1987) (describing the
problems arising from the paramount role that experts play in products liability litigation
and what measures the courts can take to temper any abuse from expert testimony); Ge-
rard Harrison, Comment, Liars, Damn Liars, and Expert Witnesses: Unhelpful Approaches
to Unreliable Scientific Testimony in the Third and Fifth Circuits, 29 Hous. L. REV. 1029,
1057 (1992) (arguing that Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703 provide superior gui-
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debate has focused on the fundamental nature of strict products
liability. 5
The second critical phase resulted from the A.L.I.'s initiation of a re-
drafting process to respond to the controversies created by section
402A.16 If the history surrounding the existing version of section 402A is
any guide, the re-drafted version will determine whether the cause of ac-
tion for strict products liability survives to adulthood and, if so, what the
nature and character of the mature cause of action will be.
Consequently, the current re-drafting process presents a unique oppor-
tunity to resolve what is arguably the major issue concerning strict prod-
ucts liability: whether the cause of action for products liability should be
grounded in strict liability or negligence. Some commentators believe,
for reasons of jurisprudence and economics, that all products liability
causes of action should lie in negligence.' 7 Other legal commentators be-
lieve that at least two of the three types of strict products liability causes
of action, those for design defect and failure to warn, should, or for all
practical purposes already do, reside in negligence. 8 This author joins a
dance for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence than the doctrines adopted by the
Third and Fifth Circuits).
15. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 10, at 649 ("calling a theory of liability based on a
duty of due care and a standard of reasonable conduct anything other than negligence is
pure sophistry."); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 1530-32 (declining to take a posi-
tion on whether design and warning defects are governed by strict liability); John W. Wade,
Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965) ("In essence, strict liability in
this sense is not different from negligence per se. Selling a dangerously unsafe product is
the equivalent of negligence regardless of the defendant's conduct in letting it become
unsafe."); Twerski, supra note 8, at 12 n.29 (1993) (quoting Henderson & TWerski, supra
note 2, at 1532, which argues that strict products liability should not be distinguished as
doctrinally separate from negligence).
16. See infra note 21 and accompanying text; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 2, at 1513 (proposing a revision of Section 402A); M. Stuart Madden, Strict Products
Liability Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A: "Don't Throw the Baby Out With
the Bathwater," 10 ToURo L. REV. 123, 124-25 (1993) (recommending that the § 402A
revision process should continue to include uniform interpretation of seller liability con-
cerning product defects); Jerry Phillips, The Proposed Products Liability Restatement: A
Misguided Revision, 10 TOURO L. REv. 151, 181-82 (1993) (warning that the proposed
revisions should not move towards a negligence standard); Vargo, supra note 4, at 23 (criti-
cizing the proposed revision process as a return to negligence).
17. E.g., William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability,
1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 639, 639-41 (commenting that current products liability law is flawed);
Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The
Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. GIN. L. REV. 1183 (1992) (documenting the "downfall of strict
products liability").
18. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 10, at 648; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at
1530-32; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products
Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 271-78 (1990) (not-
ing that in design and warning cases it is not easy to find a difference between negligence
and strict liability).
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third group of commentators who believe that strict liability has always
been, and continues to be, the appropriate theory of liability for all prod-
ucts liability causes of action. 19
The debate over the theory of liability permeates the discussion of
many other issues surrounding strict products liability. This attests to the
central nature of the liability issue. Following the maxim that "the whole
is equal to the sum of its parts," the resolution of enough sub-issues in
favor of either strict liability or negligence ultimately will carry the major
issue, along with the entire products liability cause of action, in that direc-
tion as well.
The debate over the risk-benefit and consumer expectation tests illus-
trates this point. Despite the similarity between a risk-benefit test and a
simple negligence analysis, 20 some argue that a risk-benefit test is the
only relevant test for evaluating a design defect cause of action.2' Others
19. See, e.g., Madden, supra note 16, at 147-49; Phillips, supra note 16, at 180-82 (stat-
ing that it would be mistake to try to return to negligence principles in these cases); Vargo,
supra note 4, at 24 (declaring that "[tihere are good reasons why strict liability should be
the rule").
20. See Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976) (noting that the
question is whether the risk was "unreasonable"); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753,
759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), affd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973) (balancing the likelihood and
gravity of the harm against the burden of taking precautions to avoid the harm); Aller v.
Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978) ("Proof of unreasonableness
involves a balancing process .... [of] the utility of the product [against] ... the risk of its
use."); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850-51 (Tex. 1979) (stating that
"unreasonable danger" necessarily involves balancing a product's utility against the dan-
ger); Birnbaum, supra note 10, at 605 n.54 (citing numerous cases supporting this proposi-
tion); Donaher et. al, supra note 14, at 1307 ("The unreasonable danger question, then, is
posed in terms of whether, given the risks and benefits of and possible alternatives to the
product, we as a society will live with it in its existing state or will require an altered, less
dangerous form."); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future
of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332, 1334 (1991) ("Risk-utility,
without doubt, will emerge victorious as the liability standard in generic [design] defect
cases"); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J.
825, 830 (1973).
21. As of this writing, Tentative Draft No. 2 has adopted this approach. Section 2 of
the Draft takes the position that the risk-benefits test should be controlling, and the con-
sumer expectation test eliminated as a separate test for product defect. See Tentative Draft
No. 2, supra note 3, at 50-83.
This approach is clearly against the weight of a significant majority of relevant cases.
Specifically, 20 jurisdictions define design defect by almost exclusive reference to the con-
sumer expectations test. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-102 (Michie 1987) (defining "unrea-
sonably dangerous" in terms of consumer expectations); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-2.5
(Burns 1992) (providing that a product is defective if it is (1) in a condition not contem-
plated by a reasonable consumer, and (2) unreasonably dangerous); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 28-01.1-05 (1991) (defining "unreasonably dangerous" in terms of an ordinary and rea-
sonable consumer's contemplation of the products characteristics, risks, and benefits); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-73-10, 15-73-30 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (establishing liability for sale of
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product in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to consumers, and adopting the
comments to § 402A); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(8) (1980) (defining "unreasonably
dangerous" in terms of consumer expectations). The following cases adopt the consumer
expectation test in a variety of situations. See Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 454 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (applying Maryland risk-utility balancing sheet to a strict liability claim involving
a forklift because the District of Columbia did not have a case setting out the element of
products liability); Casrell v. Altec Indus., 335 So. 2d 128, 133 (Ala. 1976) (uninsulated
telescopic truck arm); Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 429 A.2d 486, 487-88
(Conn. 1980) (defective home furnace); Slepski v. Williams Ford, Inc., 364 A.2d 175, 178
(Conn. 1975) (unreasonably dangerous automobile wheel suspension); Rojas v. Lindsay
Mfg. Co., 701 P.2d 210, 210-12 (Idaho 1985) (drive shaft of an irrigation system); Aller v.
Rodgers Machinery Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Iowa 1978) (applying the balancing
test in the case of a defective saw manufactured by defendant); Barnes v. Vega Indus., 676
P.2d 761, 762-63 (Kan. 1984) (firestop spacer in metal chimney); Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc.,
641 P.2d 353, 354, 359-61 (Kan. 1982) (gas stove for mobile home); Miles Labs. v. Doe, 556
A.2d 1107, 1112-13 (Md. 1989) (HIV-contaminated blood); Phipps v. General Motors
Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 956, 959 (Md. 1976) (automobile accelerator mechanism); Rahmig v.
Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 68-69 (Neb. 1987) (guillotine metal scrap shear); Kohler
v. Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601, 607 (Neb. 1971) (automobile steering sector gear);
Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 135, 138 (Nev. 1970) (automatic hotel door);
Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 560 P.2d 934, 937-38 (N.M. 1977) (uninsulated construction crane
electrocuted the operator); Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770, 774 (Okla.
1988) (tractor trailer with no method for determining gas level in tanks); Kirkland v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Okla. 1974) (automobile seat support); Ewen v.
McLean Trucking Co., 706 P.2d 929, 934 (Or. 1985) (truck design with blind spot); Dauphin
Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 596 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. Super. 1991)
(alcoholic beverage); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 779 (R.I.
1988) (the drug DES); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 261-63 (R.I. 1971)
(home stove); Vincer v. Esther William All-Aluminumn Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d
794, 798 (Wis. 1975) (lack of latch on pool gate); Arbet v. Gussarson, 225 N.W.2d 431, 435
(Wis. 1975) (location of automobile gas tank).
Four jurisdictions define design defect by almost exclusive reference to the risk-utility
test. Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585, 587-88 (La. 1980) (department store escala-
tor); Prather v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 526 So. 2d 1325, 1326,1330-31 (La. Ct. App.) (exca-
vator ingress and egress system), cert. denied, 531 So. 2d 272 (La. 1988); St. Germain v.
Husqvarna Corp., 544 A.2d 1283, 1284-85 (Me. 1988) (chain saw); Stanley v. Schiavi Mo-
bile Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144, 1146,1148 (Me. 1983) (fall from a mobile home); Sperry-
New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 252-56 (Miss. 1993) (combine); Thibault v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 845-46 (N.H. 1978) (power lawn mower).
Finally, 13 jurisdictions define design defect by using both the consumer expectations
test and the risk-utility test. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(2) (West 1993) (establishing
consumer recognition of product's potential harmfulness as a defense to products liability
action for design defect, but refusing to allow the defense where danger posed by product
could be eliminated without impairing product's usefulness); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.030(1)(a)&(3) (West 1992) (establishing manufacturer liability for design defects by
reference to risk-benefit test, but directing trier of fact to consider consumer expectations
in determining whether product was not reasonably safe); Birchfield v. International Har-
vester Co., 726 F.2d 1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1984) (applying Ohio law, court held either test
applicable to a front end loader that did not have a protective guard); see, e.g., Shanks v.
Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992) (holding that both the consumer, in this
case a physician expectation test and risk-utility test applicable in evaluating drug design);
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884-86 (Alaska 1979) (finding either test
applicable in evaluating the design of a front end loader); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 709 P.2d
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argue that the consumer expectation test still should play a significant
role.22 Clearly, the consumer expectation test places far less emphasis on
the reasonableness of the product design and, therefore, is significantly
less similar to a negligence analysis. Thus, depending on the prominence
the risk-benefit test is given, the theory-of-liability issue can be decided
without even being articulated.
876, 882 (Ariz. 1985) (declaring preference for consumer expectations test, but allowing
risk-utility test where it was impossible to evaluate consumer expectations of an industrial
paper shredder); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454-56 (Cal. 1978) (adopting two-
pronged approach in which either test could be used to evaluate forklift design); Camacho
v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240, 1244-48 (Colo. 1987) (reasoning that an integrated
consumer expectations-risk-benefit test was appropriate to evaluate the motorcycle design
because the technical nature of the evidence precluded total reliance on the consumer
expectations test), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Hobart Corp. v. Siegle, 600 So. 2d
503, 504-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (approving instructions for jury to apply an integrated
consumer expectations test to evaluate food grinder design), review denied, 606 So. 2d 1165
(Fla. 1992); Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 579 (approving an instruction
allowing the jury to apply either test to evaluate van design), recons denied, 833 P.2d 899
(Haw. 1989); Besse v. Deere & Co., 604 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (I11. App. Ct. 1992) (declaring
that an integrated consumer expectations/risk-utility test is applicable to evaluate a corn
combine design), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 511 (I11. 1993); Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp.,
569 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (I11. App. Ct. 1991) (noting the general applicability of either test,
but holding that only the consumer expectations test was applicable to evaluate deep fat
fryer); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky. 1980) (holding that
consumer expectations test and other factors were applicable to evaluate design of flamma-
ble T-shirt); Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 607 A.2d 637, 642-43 (N.J. 1992) (listing
consumer expectations as a factor to be considered in application of the risk-utility test to
power miter saw); Dewey v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1252-55 (N.J.
1990) (combining both tests to harms incurred from cigarettes prior to enactment of rele-
vant statute, but affirming the lower court's decision to proceed under risk-utility analysis);
Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207-09 (N.Y. 1983) (applying the inte-
grated test to circular saw design); Fallon v. Clifford B. Hannay & Son, Inc., 550 N.Y.S.2d
135 (App. Div. 1989) (applying integrated test to hose reel design); Knitz v. Minster Mach.
Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio) (holding either test applicable to evaluate design of indus-
trial press without safety guard), cert. denied sub nom., Cincinnati Milacron Chems. v.
Blankenship, 459 U.S. 857 (1982); Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d
784, 786 (Tex. 1988) (concurring opinion) (finding consumer expectations test applicable to
design of utility wire); Morris v. Adolph Coors Co., 735 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Ct. App.
1987) (finding consumer expectations test applicable to alcoholic beverage); Falk v. Keene
Corp., 782 P.2d 974, 980 (Wash. 1989) (holding either test applicable to asbestos).
The risk-benefit/consumer expectations issue is not the focus of this article. Commenta-
tors who have written exhaustively on the subject have concluded that the consumer ex-
pectation test is the preferred method of achieving strict liability. Phillips, supra note 16, at
168-70 (commenting that the consumer expectations test is easier for a juror to grasp);
Vargo, supra note 4, at 26 (stating that the consumer expectations test is the most popular).
In addition, the authority cited in Tentative Draft No. 2 that supports applying the risk-
benefit test has been criticized. See, e.g., Roland F. Banks & Margaret O'Connor, Restat-
ing the Restatement (Second), Section 402A-Design Defect, 72 OR. L. REv. 411, 413-14
(1993).
22. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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An equally significant sub-issue affected by the theory-of-liability issue
centers on the role that proximate cause plays in products liability ac-
tions. Though this role has received far less discussion than other issues
surrounding section 402A, the expansion of the relationship between
proximate cause and products liability actions is equally capable of ulti-
mately deciding the theory of liability issue for products liability actions
in general.
II. THE INEXTRICABLE CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE TO NEGLIGENCE
Whether viewed from either a historical or theoretical perspective, the
American tort law doctrine of proximate cause primarily is a negligence
doctrine. While this does not necessarily preclude the doctrine's applica-
tion to strict liability causes of action, it clearly complicates the effort.23
A. A Historical Perspective
The doctrine of proximate cause was introduced into, and developed
within, American tort law through negligence cases.24 While there are a
myriad of ways to illustrate this point, the most direct and efficient
method is by reference to the two cornerstone cases, MacPherson v. Bu-
ick Motor Company25 and Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Company26
23. A number of commentators have written insightfully on the questionable use of
foreseeability in strict liability causes of action. See, e.g., ROBERT E. CARTWRIGHT &
JERRY J. PHILLIPS, 2 PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8.17 (1986) ("Foreseeability is a negligence
concept-defendant is negligent if he has failed to exercise due care to avoid a foreseeable
injury. As a negligence concept, it arguably has no place in strict liability law.").
24. See, e.g., Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401,
1403-17 (1961) [hereinafter foreseeability]; Leon Green, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Company, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 791 (1930) [hereinafter Green-Palsgraf]; William L.
Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MicH. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1953).
25. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). The plaintiff purchased an automobile manufactured
by the defendant. Id. at 1051. The automobile subsequently collapsed, throwing the plain-
tiff from the car and injuring him. Id. At trial, the evidence suggested that one of the car's
wheels contained defective wood. Id. Although the defendant had not manufactured the
wheel, the evidence suggested the defendant could have discovered the defect through a
reasonable inspection of the wheel. Id. The defendant, however, failed to conduct a rea-
sonable inspection of the automobile prior to the sale. Id.
26. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Mrs. Palsgraf, the plaintiff, was a ticketholder who was
standing on defendant's railroad platform. Id. at 99. Two men ran to catch a train that was
departing from the station. Id. Despite the movement of the train, one of the men
reached the car without incident. Id. The other man, carrying a small package wrapped in
newspaper, jumped aboard the train, but seemed unsteady as if about to fall. Id. A guard
on the train reached forward to help him in, and as another guard attempted to steady the
man, the package fell onto the tracks. Id. Nothing in the appearance of the package al-
luded to the fireworks contained inside. Id. The fireworks exploded when they fell. Id.
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In two ways, MacPherson eloquently crowned the transformation from
liability based on privity of contract to liability based on foreseeability.27
First, MacPherson defined the concept of duty, not by the contractual
relationship between the parties, but by the relationship between the par-
ties as determined by the overall circumstances.28 Second, MacPherson
defined the concept of breach with reference to disregarding a foresee-
able risk, as opposed to referencing the terms of a contract. 29 As a result,
the modern-day negligence cause of action, which is the unreasonable ex-
posure of another to a foreseeable risk of harm, finally established its
solid theoretical underpinnings in MacPherson. 30
But the task was only half complete, for not all negligence that was the
but for cause of an injury warranted the imposition of liability. A limiting
principle was required, and the concept of foreseeability, as articulated in
Palsgraf, provided the solution.
Although the defendant company in Palsgraf was negligent, it was not
held liable to the particular plaintiff who had suffered injury. At the time,
this idea was expressed as the defendant not having breached a duty
toward the plaintiff.3 ' Despite casting itself as a discussion of breach,
The shock of the explosion threw down some scales at the other end of the platform and
injured the plaintiff. Id.
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 96.
28. "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the
consequences to be expected." MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053; see KEETON ET AL., supra
note 7, § 96.
29. "We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else."
MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053; see KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 96.
30. Grey v. Hayes-Sammons Chem. Co., 310 F.2d 291,295 (5th Cir. 1962) (recognizing
that the MacPherson decision is widely accepted in nearly all American courts); Carter v.
Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 696-97 (Mass. 1946) (explaining that the reasoning behind
MacPherson was that the manufacturer of an article assumes responsibility to consumers
arising from the manufacturer's affirmative action of putting an item on the market that is
likely to affect the interests of another); KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 96 (stating that
MacPherson "struck through the fog of the 'general rule' ... and held the maker liable for
negligence"); see Robert M. Davis, A Re-Examination of the Doctrine of MacPherson v.
Buick and its Application and Extension in the State of New York, 24 FORDHAM L. REV.
204, 205 (1955) (stating that the doctrine proclaimed in MacPherson v. Buick recognized a
tendency to impose liability for personal injury caused by negligently manufactured articles
despite a lack of privity of contract); see also Keeton, supra note 12, at 581-82 (recognizing
the uniqueness of the MacPherson decision); Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer's Liability for
Negligence, 33 TENN. L. REV. 444, 444 (1966) (stating that "Justice Cardozo's opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. still is recognized as the leading one in the field").
31. Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). "The conduct of the
defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong
in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her it was not negligence at
all." Id.
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Palsgraf represents result-within-the-risk based proximate cause. 32 Em-
ploying the nomenclature of the subsequent result-within-the-risk lan-
guage, Palsgraf held that the defendant was not liable for the plaintiff's
injuries because such injuries were not within the risk created by the de-
fendant's negligence. In essence, the defendant's negligence was not the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.3
Since the reinterpretation of Palsgraf, result-within-the-risk based
proximate cause has been subdivided further into three categories: per-
son-within-the-risk, 34 manner-within-the-risk, 35 and type-within-the-
32. See Hampton v. Federal Express Corp., 917 F.2d 1119, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1990)
(imposing liability if defendant owed a duty to plaintiff); Hegyes v. Unjian Enterprises,
Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 101 (Ct. App. 1991) (limiting liability for negligence to the area of
foreseeable plaintiffs); Green, supra note 24, at 789-91; KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 43
(explaining that there is no negligence if the injury could not reasonably have been fore-
seen from the conduct); Prosser, supra note 24, at 19 (declaring that foreseeability of risk
can be defined broadly to impose liability).
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 43 (stating that if one cannot reasonably foresee
the possibility of harm as a result of one's conduct, no liability is imposed); Dartez v. City
of Sulphur, 179 So. 2d 482, 484 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (stating that "the risk of injury encoun-
tered by the plaintiff was not within the scope of protection afforded by the duty so
breached, and therefore the defendant's negligence was not a legal cause of the plaintiff's
injuries"). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 84 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa.
1951), stated:
a reasonable man, under the present circumstances, could not foresee that anyone
standing in the street behind the bus would be injured by an object struck by
defendant's car. Plaintiff was clearly outside the orbit of risk and therefore no
right of plaintiff was invaded and defendant breached no duty which he owed to
plaintiff.
Id.; see also Oehler v. Davis, 298 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 1972) (imposing no liability
because the breach of duty had no legal connection to the resulting harm).
34. See, e.g., Drames v. Sun River Inv., S.A., 820 F. Supp. 209, 216 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(stating that liability for harm is imposed only if defendant's conduct creates a recognizable
risk of harm to a plaintiff or a particular class of persons of which the plaintiff is a mem-
ber), aff'd, 17 F.3d 1429 (3d Cir. 1994); Dahlstrom, 84 A.2d at 291-92 (ruling that it was
not foreseeable that the defendant's car would strike decedent, who crossed the street
behind a bus, and also that it was not foreseeable that the decedent's body would strike the
plaintiff causing injuries; consequently, no liability was imposed).
35. Rikstad v. Holmberg, 456 P.2d 355, 358 (Wash. 1969) (stating that if the result of
the act was within the foreseeable scope of risks arising from defendant's duty then liability
is imposed regardless of whether the risk the defendant creates culminates in harm through
an unusual manner); see Munsey v. Webb, 231 U.S. 150, 156 (1913) (declaring that "[iut was
not necessary that the defendant should have had notice of the particular method in which
an accident would occur"); Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 1960) (finding an
injury foreseeable and concluding that it was "not necessary that defendant should have
been able to anticipate the particular chain of events that would result in injury in order to
be held liable"); Ventricelli v. Kinney Sys. Rent a Car, Inc., 383 N.E.2d 1149, 1150 (N.Y.
1978) (holding it was not foreseeable that a defective trunk lid would cause plaintiff to be
hit by a car; consequently, no liability was imposed).
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risk.36 This categorizing focuses exactly on what must be foreseeable, and
thereby on the scope and limits of the defendant's liability. The result is
an overall doctrinal development of proximate, cause that is sophisticated,
detailed, useful, and substantially derived from negligence cases.
B. The Theoretical Perspective
It is not just the historical baggage of negligence that questions the
applicability of proximate cause to strict liability. Negligence and proxi-
mate cause are so inextricably interwoven on a theoretical level that per-
forming a negligence analysis has become a de facto prerequisite for
performing a proximate cause analysis.
Traditionally, negligence has been defined as a breach of duty.37 To
determine if the defendant's conduct constitutes a breach, courts gener-
ally consider two elements: whether the defendant took a foreseeable
risk, and what alternative courses of conduct were available to the de-
fendant. A breach is established if the reasonable person would have
foreseen the risk and chosen an alternative course of conduct.38
Assuming that the plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred but for
the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's final burden is to show that the
breach of duty is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.3 9 With re-
sult-within-the-risk based proximate cause, this amounts to a comparison
of the risk that made the defendant's conduct a breach of duty in the first
place with the several aspects of the plaintiff's resulting injury.4" Specifi-
cally, the subdivisions of the result-within-the-risk based category of
proximate cause serve to limit a negligent defendant's liability. The per-
son-within-the-risk approach focuses on whether it was foreseeable that
the person who was injured was subject to the risk that made the defend-
ant's conduct a breach of duty in the first place.41 The manner-within-
36. 36. See Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1954) (ex-
plaining that "where an article is not inherently dangerous in its normal or intended use
neither its manufacturer nor vendor is liable for a result which is brought about by its
subjection to unusual and extraordinary conditions"), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 923 (1955);
Beickert v. G.M. Labs., 151 N.E. 195, 196 (N.Y. 1926) (holding that the article causing an
injury must be inherently dangerous before plaintiff may recover).
37. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 30 (defining breach of duty as "[a] failure on the
person's part to conform to the standard required").
38. Id. §§ 30, 31.
39. Id. § 42.
40. Id. § 43; Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co., Ltd., 1961
App. Cas. 388, 393 (P.C. 1961) (comparing the foreseeability of the risk caused by escaping
oil underneath a wharf and the resulting damages caused when it caught fire).
41. See Tropea v. Shell Oil Co., 307 F.2d 757,766 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that the burn
sustained by the plaintiff when an employee of the defendant washed a gasoline mixture
down the drain of a filling station was within the risk that the defendant's employee had a
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the-risk approach focuses on whether the way in which the injury oc-
curred was foreseeable at the time the risk was taken.42 Finally, the type-
within-the-risk approach focuses on whether the type of harm suffered
was foreseeable at the time the risk was taken.4 ?
From this perspective, the Palsgraf court's refusal to impose liability on
the defendant could be expressed as a failure to show that either a duty to
the plaintiff was breached or that the plaintiff was a person-within-the-
risk of the breach of duty. Additionally, the plaintiff in Palsgraf arguably
was not injured in a foreseeable manner, nor was the type of injury suf-
fered foreseeable at the time of the negligent action.
Applying this proximate cause analysis to strict products liability cre-
ates a significant theoretical problem: what should be compared to the
plaintiff's resultant injury due to a defective product. The injury cannot
simply be compared to the defendant's risk-creating conduct because that
would amount to a negligence analysis. One answer is that result-within-
the-risk based proximate cause should be integrated into the realm of
strict products liability by comparing the plaintiff's injury to the risk the
unreasonably dangerous product creates. 4 Applying this approach to the
subdivisions of proximate cause, the person-within-the-risk approach
would focus on whether it was foreseeable that the product could have
duty not to create, consequently, liability was imposed); Ozark Indus. v. Stubbs Transports,
351 F. Supp. 351, 359 (W.D. Ark. 1972); Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 84 A.2d 289, 290 (Pa. 1951)
(stating the test as "whether the wrongdoer could have anticipated and foreseen the likeli-
hood of harm to the injured person, resulting from his act"); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence
§ 14 (1989); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 4 (1966).
42. See Swearngin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637,642 (10th Cir. 1967) (declar-
ing that "[w]here an act is negligent, it is not necessary, to render it the proximate cause,
that the person committing it could or might have foreseen the particular consequence or
precise form of the injury, or the particular manner in which it occurred"); Derdiarian v.
Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670 (N.Y. 1980); Diakolios v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 127 A.2d 603, 605 (Pa. 1956); Vereb v. Markowitz, 108 A.2d 774, 777 (Pa. 1954).
43. See Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn. 1977) (harm
caused by space heater was foreseeable where the seller was informed of the condition
under which the heater was to be used); Doughty v. Turner Mfg. Co., 1964 1 Q.B. 518, 524-
25 (C.A. 1963) (imposing no liability because the type of damage resulting from defend-
ant's conduct was unforeseeable).
44. See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1275 n.5 (8th Cir.
1972) (explaining that foreseeability depends upon accumulated experience and observa-
tions of a product's usage); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1196-97 (Alaska 1992)
(describing factors, such as the gravity of the danger, that the fact-finder should consider
when deciding whether a prescription drug manufacturer has met the burden of proving
that the benefits of design outweigh the risk); Crankshaw v. Piedmont Driving Club, Inc.,
156 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (the defendant's serving of unwholesome food to
another person was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries from the fall);
Richelman v. Kewanee Mach. & Conveyor Co., 375 N.E.2d 885, 889 (I11. App. Ct. 1978)
(holding that whether a child's injuries, sustained when the child tripped into a grain auger,
were foreseeable, was a question for the jury).
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injured the person;45 the manner-within-the-risk would focus on whether
it was foreseeable that the defective product could inflict an injury in the
way the plaintiff was injured;46 and the type-within-the-risk approach
would focus on whether it was foreseeable that the defective product
could inflict the type of injury sustained.47
Result-within-the-risk based proximate cause focuses on the product as
opposed to conduct and, therefore, superficially maintains the distinction
between strict liability and negligence. This framework appears suspect
because of the degree of foreseeability it injects into the strict products
liability analysis. In addition, this framework is too susceptible to becom-
ing a misdirected analysis of the manufacturer's conduct as he manufac-
tured the product, instead of a proper analysis focusing on the product
itself.
This suspicion is confirmed upon examination of the risk-benefits test,
the principal test for defining "defective product." Under this test, a
product is defective if the risk it creates outweighs the benefits it be-
stows. 48 The extent of the risk created is calculated with reference to a
number of factors, including any economically and technologically feasi-
ble alternatives.49
45. See, e.g., Winnett v. Winnett, 310 N.E.2d 1, 4 (I11. 1974) (stating that liability only
will be imposed if the plaintiff's conduct "in placing her fingers in the moving screen or
belt of the forage wagon was reasonably foreseeable"); Richelman, 375 N.E.2d at 888 (re-
viewing authorities that focus on the foreseeability of an injury).
46. See, e.g., Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 1960) (imposing liability
for a butchers' injuries sustained when a rubber band sprang off a shank of lamb and struck
the butcher in the eye, because the injury resulted from an improper application of the
rubber bank and the meat company knew or should have known that such an injury could
result); Swearngin, 376 F.2d at 642 (submitting to the jury the question of whether the
defendant could have reasonably known or foreseen injury suffered by plaintiff when his
sunglass lens was shattered and his eye penetrated by a stick thrown from the discharge
chute of a lawnmower the defendant sold).
47. See, e.g., Frey, 258 N.W.2d at 787 (holding that whether defendant could reason-
ably foresee that its space heater would be used in a trailer where plaintiffs raised chinchil-
las and would overheat causing death of the animals was a question properly submitted to
the jury).
48. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 99.
49. See, e.g., Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414 (Colo. 1986)
(listing the factors that may be considered in determining the reasonableness of a product);
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g, 386 A.2d 816, 827 (N.J. 1978) (recognizing that a factor to
consider when determining whether a product is not duly safe is the manufacturer's ability
to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing the products utility or
incurring too much expense), overruled on other grounds by Suter v. San Angelo Foundry
& Mach. Co., 406 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1979); Roach v. Kononen, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (Or. 1974)
(agreeing that the feasibility of a substitute product meeting the same need but that would
not be unsafe is a factor to be considered by the court before submitting a design defect
case to the jury); see, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 2, at 1512 n.27 (citing Wade,
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Clearly, the risk-benefits test is conduct based; it balances the alterna-
tives available to the manufacturer with the risk his conduct created.
Comparing the risk of the defective product to the resultant injury suf-
fered by the plaintiff really amounts to a comparison of the manufac-
turer's conduct with the resultant injury. Thus, by using the risk-benefit
test to define product defectiveness on one end, and proximate cause to
limit liability for injuries caused by defective products on the other, the
strict product liability cause of action is effectively boxed into negligence.
C. A Necessary Perspective
Though the subtleties of the risk-benefit analysis as a means for deter-
mining product defectiveness are beyond the scope of this article,5" the
test will remain in place even in the strict liability cause of action. In any
event, it would be inaccurate for any revision of section 402A to deny the
significance of the test.51 Nonetheless, it is undeniable that focusing on
the test pushes the liability action toward negligence and that one of the
two critical sub-issues, therefore, is being resolved in a way that reduces
the chance that the strict liability-based products liability cause of action
will survive. It is imperative to the survival of the strict products liability-
based cause of action to eliminate proximate cause as a separate compo-
nent of the product liability cause of action.
At first, such a proposal may seem counterintuitive, as it is a funda-
mental principle of United States civil law that tort and contract damages
be limited to what is reasonably foreseeable.52 If eliminating proximate
supra note 20, at 837-38 which lists seven factors to be balanced in determining whether a
product is reasonably safe).
50. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (detailing the application of risk-
benefit analysis in product liability actions).
51. Id.
52. Hampton v. Federal Express Corp., 917 F.2d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 1990) (imposing
no liability because the defendant could not reasonably foresee injury to plaintiff); Evra
Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir.) (declaring that "the rule of Hadley
v. Baxendale ... corresponds to the tort principle that limits liability to the foreseeable
consequence of defendant's carelessness"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982); Herman v.
Welland Chem., Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 823, 826 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (limiting chemical trans-
porter's liability to the scope of harms that result from abnormally dangerous activities);
Hughes Tool Co. v. United Artists Corp., 110 N.Y.S.2d 383, 385 (1952) (stating that "dam-
ages for breach of contract shall be such as have resulted directly and naturally from the
breach, and were within the contemplation of the parties"), affid, 110 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y.
1953); Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854) (holding that recovery for
damages should be limited to what reasonably could have been foreseen by the parties at
the time they formed a contract); see also DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 12.6, at 831 (1973) (noting that in order to recover, the damages claimed must
have been within the contemplation of the parties); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNS-
WORTH ON CONTRAcrs § 12.14, at 240 (1990) (stating that "[a] party in breach is not liable
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cause in strict products liability constitutes removing foreseeability as a
limiting principle, then the proposal will have no impact. The courts
overwhelmingly have rejected53 the hindsight approach,54 which is the
one major theoretical approach that goes furthest toward eliminating the
problem offered by foreseeability.
The proposal to eliminate proximate cause as a separate element of the
strict products liability cause of action is not at riik of being similarly
discounted. This is because foreseeability has penetrated the strict prod-
ucts liability cause of action at many other levels. Even absent a separate
proximate cause component, damages will nonetheless be limited to the
foreseeable consequences. Thus, the cause of action for strict products
liability can be preserved without sacrificing the limits that protect de-
fendants from unforeseeable damages. The next section provides an
analysis of how the protection afforded defendants by result-within-the-
risk based proximate cause is either unnecessary or already afforded by
other burdens placed upon the plaintiff in the strict products liability
cause of action.
for damages that the party did not at the time of contracting have reason to foresee as a
probable result of the breach"); KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, at Ch. 7 (discussing proxi-
mate cause); 1 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed. 1990).
53. See Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984) (restricting the New
Jersey Supreme Court's earlier decision in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. which
imputed manufacturer's knowledge to asbestos cases);'Andrew T. Berry, Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Products Corp.: Revolution-Or Aberration-In Products Liability Law, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 786, 787 (1984) (concluding that Beshada was an "unprecedented de-
parture from prior products liability cases" and should be limited to its facts); James Hen-
derson, Revising Section 402A: The Limits of Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV.
107, 121-22 (1993) (arguing that the hindsight analysis of Beshada was bad in that it permit-
ted tort law to be used as social insurance); see also Henderson & TWerski, supra note 18,
at 274-75 (warning that "liability for unknowable risks is a weed that should not be allowed
to take root in the failure-to-warn garden"); Victor E. Schwartz, The Death of "Super Strict
Liability" Common Sense Returns to Tort Law, 27 GONz. L. REV. 179, 180 (1992) (arguing
that hindsight liability will discourage production of goods that consumers want).
54. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. 1982)
(assuming the manufacturer's knowledge that a product was dangerous, even if the manu-
facturer had no such actual knowledge); Diamond, supra note 10, at 540 (explaining that
hindsight analysis without exceptions differentiates strict products liability from negli-
gence); see also Wade, supra note 20, at 834-35 (arguing that in strict liability actions "the
scienter is supplied as a matter of law" even if at time of manufacture, the dangerousness
of a product was unknown to the manufacturer); W. Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liabil-
ity: The' Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 559, 568 (1969); see generally John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734 (1983) (addressing the
availability of knowledge to the manufacturer of a product's safety and any potential
liability).
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP OF RESULT-WITHIN-THE-RISK BASED
PROXIMATE CAUSE TO THE STRICr PRODUCTS LIABILITY
CAUSE OF ACTION
A. Person-Within-the-Risk
It always has been possible to group strict products liability plaintiffs
into one of several categories: one in privity with the seller,55 user or
consumer,56 or bystander.57 Over the years, several rules have emerged
that reflect the policy decisions regarding whether a category of plaintiffs
was foreseeable from the defendant manufacturer's point of view.58 Due
to these developments, applying the person-within-the-risk category of
result-within-the-risk based proximate cause now involves little more
than classifying the plaintiff as a member of one of the foreseeable'
categories.
Regarding plaintiffs in privity of contract with the seller, Comment I to
section 402A states clearly that such classification is irrelevant to bringing
a strict products liability cause of action.59 Using language that is in-
tended to be inclusive, the Comment specifically states that those who
have not acquired the product directly from the seller (as well as those
who have) can bring a strict products liability action.6" In effect, the
Restatement simply tracks the doctrinal developments away from privity
and toward foreseeability.6 1 The relevant portion of Comment 1 affirms
55. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (marking the change from liability
based on priority of contract to liability based on foreseeability).
56. The terms "user" or "consumer" of a product are applied in a very broad sense
when arguing about strict liability. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 100; see, e.g., Thomp-
son v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120, 121-23 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (holding that passengers in
automobiles were users); Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31, 32-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding passengers in airplanes were users); Connolly v. Hagi, 188 A.2d
884, 887 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1963) (holding a filling station mechanic doing work on a car
was a user); Graham v. Bottenfield's Inc., 269 P.2d 413, 415 (Kan. 1954) (affirming that a
customer of a beauty shop was a user).
57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 100 (explaining that a bystander is "one who was
making no use at all of [a] product except to be injured by it"); see Elmore v. American
Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (holding that the purpose of strict liability in tort
was to make the industry responsible for all the foreseeable harm done by its defective
products and that the bystander was entitled to as much if not more protection as the
consumer); cf. Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713, 717 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding that a
pedestrian hit by an automobile could not recover in the absence of negligence because he
was not within the class of persons the seller sought to reach and pedestrian had not relied
in any way upon the seller's implied warranty).
58. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 cmt. I (1965) (stating that "[i]t is not
even necessary that the consumer have purchased the product at all").
60. Id.
61. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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that "[t]he liability stated is one in tort, and does not require any contrac-
tual relation, or privity of contract, between the plaintiff and the
defendant."62
The Restatement is equally clear regarding the category of "user or
consumer." Section 402A states that sellers of defective products are lia-
ble "to the user or consumer., 63 Comment 1 then defines "user or con-
sumer" very broadly to include direct purchasers, indirect purchasers,
family members, employees, invitees, and donees of the purchaser, as
well as those preparing, ultimately using, passively enjoying, or working
on the product.64 There is universal agreement that a user or consumer is
an appropriate category of plaintiff in a strict products liability cause of
action.65 In addition, there is also a consensus regarding those situations
in which a user should not be allowed to bring a strict liability cause of
action, such as the sub-category of sophisticated bulk user.66
The only remaining issue is whether strict products liability extends to
bystanders. The Restatement expressly left the issue open.67 While not-
ing that most courts have not extended recovery to bystanders, the Re-
statement offers that "[t]here may be no essential reason why such
plaintiffs should not be brought within the scope of the protection af-
forded."68 Subsequently, many courts have followed this suggestion.69
The Illinois cases of Winnett v. Winnett7° and Richelman v. Kewanee
Machinery and Conveyor Company7 provide dramatic illustrations of
the conflicting results that can occur depending on whether bystanders
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. 1 (1965). The text of § 402A in-
corporates comment I by stating in relevant part: "The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies
although ... the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller." Id. § 402A(2)(b).
63. Id. § 402(A)(1) (stating in relevant part: "One who sells any product in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer").
64. Id. § 402(A) cmt. 1.
65. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 100.
66. See, e.g., Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 671 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Md.
1987) (holding that "[t]here is no duty on product suppliers to warn ultimate users... of
product-related hazards in products supplied in bulk to a knowledgeable user"), aff'd, 863
F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1988); Purvis v. PPG Indus., 502 So. 2d 714, 722 (Ala. 1987) (discussing
the difficulty of warning devices on bulk sale items); Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737
F,2d 1453, 1456-57 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (stating as a caveat that "[t]he Institute
expresses no opinion as to whether the rules .. . may not apply ... to harm to persons
other than users or consumers").
68. Id. § 402A cmt. 0.
69. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
70. 310 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1974).
71. 375 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. 1978).
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are persons within the risk in strict product liability. Both cases involved
children who were injured after a limb became entangled in a piece of
farm machinery, and both plaintiffs brought strict liability design defect
causes of action based on the design of the guards involved.72
In Winnett, the plaintiff argued that foreseeability was inapplicable to
strict tort liability, and that, alternatively, the bystander-child was a per-
son-within-the-risk.73 The court rejected both arguments, holding that:
[i]t cannot, in our judgment, fairly be said that a manufacturer
should reasonably foresee that a four-year-old child will be per-
mitted to approach an operating farm forage wagon or that the
child will be permitted to place her fingers in or on the holes in
its moving screen."
The dissent recognized this statement as a negligence-based conclusion,
and sought to reduce the impact of foreseeability on the analysis by re-
sponding that "the only foreseeability question presented on this record
is whether it is reasonably foreseeable that someone might be injured by
reason of coming into contact with the inadequately protected and unrea-
sonably dangerous mechanism."75 Li effect, the dissenting opinion abol-
ished the distinction between bystander and user, limited the scope of
person-within-the-risk, and moved the analysis back toward strict
liability.
The Richelman case embraced the view of the Winnett dissent. In al-
lowing recovery under very similar facts, the majority held that the only
question relevant to a person-within-the-risk analysis was whether the
machine had the capacity to injure because of its defective design.76 The
court specifically held that it was irrelevant whether an adult or a child
was actually injured.77
72. Winnett, 310 N.E.2d at 2 (forage wagon conveyor belt); Richelman, 375 N.E.2d at
886 (grain auger).
73. Winnett, 310 N.E.2d at 3.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 6 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
76. Richelman, 375 N.E.2d at 888.
77. Id. at 889.
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Currently, the overwhelming majority of legislatures78 and courts79 that
have dealt with the issue have allowed bystanders to recover if they
otherwise satisfy the elements of the cause of action. The reasons gener-
ally proffered for allowing bystander recovery include: (1) the fact that
the bystander is often the quintessential innocent victim, with no control
over the choice, inspection, use, or maintenance of the product;" ° (2) the
fact that protecting bystanders does not impose any additional burden on
the manufacturer because the same precautions that protect users or con-
78. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572m (West 1991) (defining claimant for
products liability purposes); IDAHO CODE § [6-1402] 6-1302 (4) (1990) (defining claimant
as any person or entity that suffers harm); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/13-213(a)(3)
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-2 (Bums 1992 & Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3302 (c,d) (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.300-320 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53 (4) (West 1991) (defining claimant as any person
or entity that asserts a claim); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.760 (Vernon 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:58C-l(b)(1) (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (Michie 1995) (providing a jury
instruction that places liability on the supplier for injuries to both reasonably foreseeable
consumers of the product and persons in the general vicinity when the product is used);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A) (Anderson 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920(3) (1993)
(declaring that liability for unreasonably dangerous product must be constructed according
to § 402A); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 29-28-102(6) (1980); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 82.001 (Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(5) (West 1992).
79. See Elmore v. American Motors Co., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (providing protec-
tion to bystanders from reasonably foreseeable product defects); West v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co., 366 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976) (applying strict liability to bystanders within the range
of harm); Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1975) (finding no
substantial reason for not protecting bystanders from defective products); Osborne v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 688 P.2d 390, 397 (Or. Ct. App.) (extending the doctrine of
strict liability to bystanders injured by unreasonably dangerous products), review dis-
missed, 691 P.2d 483 (Or. 1984); see also Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1970); Sills
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 780-81 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979); Sullivan v. Green Mfg. Co., 575 P.2d 811, 816
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., 262 A.2d 807, 809 (D.C. 1970);
Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d 421, 428 (Idaho 1974); Mieher v. Brown, 278 N.E.2d 869,
874 (II. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 301 N.E.2d 307 (Il. 1973); Walker v. Clark Equip.
Co., 320 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Iowa 1982); Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d
754, 755 (La. 1971); Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Mich. 1965);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 486 So. 2d 374, 378 (Miss. 1986); Giberson v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo. 1974); Tirrell v. Navistar Int'l, Inc., 591 A.2d 643, 649-50
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 166 (N.J. 1991); Codling v. Paglia, 298
N.E.2d 622, 628 (N.Y. 1973); Jones v. White Motor Corp., 401 N.E.2d 223, 226, 230 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1978); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622, 626 (Okla. 1974); Webb v. Zern, 220
A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966); Russell v. Bishop, 1986 WL 653 *2, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7,
1986); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W. 630, 633 (Tex. 1969); Howes v. Hansen, 201
N.W.2d 825, 828 (Wis. 1972).
80. See, e.g., Elmore, 451 P.2d. at 89; Weber, 250 So. 2d at 755; Reeves, 486 So. 2d at
378 n.2; Osborne, 688 P.2d at 397; Howes, 201 N.W.2d at 830-31.
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sumers also protect bystanders;81 and (3) the general notion that bystand-
ers should be protected at least as much as users or consumers.82
Based on the traditional protection afforded users and consumers,
along with the more recent development regarding bystanders, the strict
products liability cause of action has developed to the point that virtually
all potential plaintiffs are qualified to bring an action. Initially, this may
seem to deprive defendants of all protection afforded by the person-
within-the-risk category of result-within-the-risk based proximate cause.
Moreover, notions of foreseeability, person-within-the-risk, and proxi-
mate cause usually are not even articulated during the course of debate.
Consequently, it is unclear why most authorities and commentators ap-
pear willing to impose liability.
This lack of explicit acknowledgement, however, does not hide the fact
that everyone is a foreseeable plaintiff from the point of view of defective
products and person-within-the-risk. Appropriately, consumers, users,
and bystanders recover in strict products liability in an almost endless
variety of contexts.83 Even Mrs. Palsgraf herself, the most famous of dis-
appointed bystanders, would surely be considered a person-within-the-
risk under a modern strict liability analysis if she had been injured by a
defective train or explosive device.
Thus, result-within-the-risk based proximate cause should not be an el-
ement of the strict products liability cause of action if it is employed to
afford the defendants person-within-the-risk category protection. A real-
istic assessment of foreseeability and the rules and policies that have
flowed therefrom have rendered the protection inapplicable. Theoreti-
cally, person-within-the-risk always was available to limit the liability of
manufacturers. In virtually all cases, however, liability with respect to
person-within-the-risk is appropriate. As such, the person-within-the-risk
concept safely can be eliminated as a matter of law.
When person-within-the-risk has been used to protect defendant manu-
facturers in strict products liability actions, the analysis has been mis-
placed. For example, in Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical
Center,8 4 a passenger who was injured by a driver who consumed alcohol
after taking prescription drugs brought a failure-to-warn claim against the
81. See, e.g., Embs, 528 S.W.2d at 705; Miecher, 278 N.E.2d at 874; Moss, 522 P.2d at
627.
82. Sills, 296 F. Supp. at 781; Green Mfg. Co., 575 P.2d at 816; Cottom, 262 A.2d at
809; West, 336 So. 2d at 92; Miecher, 278 N.E.2d at 874; Giberson, 504 S.W.2d at 11-12;
Howes, 210 N.W.2d at 829.
83. See'supra notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
84. 513 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
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drug manufacturer.85 In denying recovery, the court stated that the man-
ufacturer could not "have reasonably foreseen that their drugs would be
dispensed without warnings by the physicians, that the patient would be
discharged from the hospital, drink alcohol, drive a car, lose control of his
car, hit a tree, and injure the passenger.., on the same day."86 Basing
this reasoning on the concept of person-within-the-risk clearly is wrong.
A passenger, bystander, or anyone or anything on a street is within the
risk created by a drug whose manufacturer fails to adequately warn the
ingesting consumer that driving or operating heavy machinery should be
avoided.
On the other hand, the reasoning could be based on concepts of inter-
vening cause, misuse, or other concepts more generally associated with
the manner in which, as opposed to on whom, the injury was inflicted.
Such analysis raises the following issue of manner-within-the-risk cate-
gory of result-within-the-risk based proximate cause.
B. Manner-Within-the-Risk
1. In general
The manner-within-the-risk category of result-within-the-risk based
proximate cause focuses on the way the harm occurs. As developed in
negligence and applied to the actor's conduct, the precise manner in
which negligent conduct will cause harm need not be foreseeable, but
harm that occurs in a highly extraordinary way will relieve the negligent
actor of liability.87 Thus, Palsgraf also can be analyzed as a manner-
within-the-risk case. From the defendant Long Island Railroad's perspec-
tive, injuries could have resulted from its negligent conduct in several
ways: a plaintiff could have been pushed down, knocked over, or even
forced between cars or under the train; all would have been foreseeable,
but the triggering of an explosion knocking a scale onto a distant plaintiff
would not be on the list of foreseeable occurrences.
In the strict products liability context, the attempt is made to apply
manner-within-the-risk to the way the harm from the defective product
occurred. From this perspective, Winnett could also be thought of as a
85. Id. at 390-91.
86. Id. at 394. The plaintiff sought to recover damages on the theory that the manu-
facturers failed to adequately warn of Thorazine's dangerous propensities, which include
diminishing the physical and mental abilities of the user. Id. at 391.
87. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435(1) (1965) (stating that "the fact that
the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in
which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable"); see, e.g., Derdiarian v. Felix
Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 671 (N.Y. 1980) (noting that "[t]he precise manner of
the event need not be anticipated").
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manner-within-the-risk case. Accordingly, the focus is on the fact that
the harm occurred because the child intentionally inserted her fingers
into the machine, and that this manner could not be foreseen. Most
courts have not required that the manner of the injury be foreseen so
precisely.88 Two arguably extreme examples are provided by Moran v.
Faberge, Inc.,89 and Green v. Denney.90
In Moran, a teenage girl, "[a]pparently ...at a loss for entertain-
ment,"91 poured a bottle of the defendant's Tigress Cologne over a burn-
ing candle. The cologne ignited and burned the plaintiff.92 The plaintiff
argued that the defendant manufacturer should have provided a warning
that the cologne was highly flammable.93 The defendant argued that the
manner in which the cologne was ignited, and thus the manner in which
the harm occurred, was unforeseeable. 94 In rejecting the defendant's ar-
gument, the court quoted everyone from Cicero to Quinton Ennius, but
ultimately settled on the following language from Professor Harper:
[T]he courts are perfectly accurate in declaring that there can be
no liability where the harm is unforeseeable, if 'foreseeability'
refers to the general type of harm sustained. It is literally true
that there is no liability for damage that falls entirely outside the
general threat of harm which made the conduct of the actor neg-
ligent. The sequence of events, of course, need not be foresee-
able. The manner in which the risk culminates in harm may be
unusual, improbable and highly unexpectable, from the point of
view of the actor at the time of his conduct. And yet, if the harm
suffered falls within the general danger area, there may be liabil-
ity, provided other requisites of legal causation are present. 9'
88. See, e.g., Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637, 642 (10th Cir. 1967).
The court, quoting Atherton v. Goodwin, 180 P.2d 296, 300 (Kan. 1947) stated that:
[w]here an act is negligent, it is not necessary, to render it the proximate cause,
that the person committing it could or might have foreseen ... the particular
manner in which it occurred, if by the exercise of reasonable care it might have
been foreseen or anticipated that some injury might result.
Id.; see, e.g., Katz v. Swift & Co., 276 F.2d 905, 906 (2d Cir. 1960) (holding that the defend-
ant did not have to anticipate the exact chain of events resulting in injury for liability to be
imposed); Noonan v. Buick Co., 211 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (finding that
foreseeability depended on whether the type of negligent act reasonably could be expected
to recur).
89. 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
90. 742 P.2d 639 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
91. Moran, 332 A.2d at 13.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 13-14.
94. Id. at 14.
95. Id. at 19 (quoting HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 7 (1933) (em-
phasis added)).
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The Moran court concluded that "it was not necessary for a cologne
manufacturer to foresee that someone would be hurt when a friend
poured its product near the flame of a lit candle."96 : Rather, "it was only
necessary that it be foreseeable to the producer that its product, while in
its normal environment, may be brought near a catalyst" for ignition. 97
In Green, the plaintiff was driving a Ford Pinto when he collided with a
horse.98 The horse was thrown into the air and landed on the roof of the
car.99 The roof collapsed and the plaintiff's wife was killed.100 The plain-
tiff sued the manufacturer for defective roof design. The manufacturer
made several manner-within-the-risk arguments, including that "the acci-
dent was freak and bizarre,"' 0 ' and that it was not foreseeable that a
collision with a horse or other heavy animal "would produce an impact
on the roof concentrated at a particular point rather than being more
evenly distributed.' 0°2 Focusing on the evidence that the roof of the car
should have been designed to be stronger, the court rejected these argu-
ments and held that the way the accident occurred was foreseeable. 0 3
The rejection of the manufacturer's manner-within-the-risk arguments
in such extreme circumstances minimizes manner-within-the-risk to the
point of elimination as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie strict
products liability case. While relieving the plaintiff of this proximate
cause burden runs counter to traditional principles regarding the role of
proximate cause in the tort context, defendants are afforded ample pro-
tection regarding unforeseeable manner by the doctrine of plaintiff mis-
use. In the products liability context specifically, it has long been
established that any unforeseeable misuse of the product by the plaintiff
provides the manufacturer with an affirmative defense. That a plaintiff
has put a product to an unforeseeable misuse is nearly identical to argu-
ing that the harm occurred in a manner that was unforeseeable. Thus, the
manufacturer is relieved of liability upon unforeseeable misuse of the
product.' 04
96. Id. at 20.
97. Id.
98. Green v. Denney, 742 P.2d 639, 640 (Or. Ct. App. 1987).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 641.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 642.
104. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 102 (explaining that "the majority American
position seems to be that an unforeseeable misuse of a product . . . is a superseding
cause"); John F. Vargo, The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary with an
Old Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REV. 447, 455-59 (1978) (noting abnormal use or misuse are
defenses); Zablotsky, supra note 13, at 205 (finding that misuse of a product is an affirma-
tive defense for the manufacturer).
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Indeed, several courts have recognized and articulated the relationship
between unforeseeable misuse and proximate cause. One of the most no-
table was Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc. 11 5 The plaintiff in Hughes lit only
two of three pilot lights on a camping stove and a resulting explosion
injured him.10 6 The plaintiff argued design defect; the defendant coun-
tered with unforeseeable misuse. The court held that:
Misuse of product is no longer to be considered an affirmative
defense in products liability actions but is rather to be treated in
connection with the plaintiff's burden of proving an unreasona-
bly dangerous condition and legal cause. Regardless of whether
a defendant does or does not plead misuse of the product the
burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the legal cause of the
injury was a product defect which rendered the product unrea-
sonably dangerous in a reasonably foreseeable use.' °7
The Hughes court correctly analyzed the relationship between misuse
and proximate cause, but erred by requiring the plaintiff to bear the bur-
den of proof as to the foreseeability of the accident. To the contrary, it
becomes critical at this point to minimize manner-within-the-risk based
proximate cause by focusing on misuse rather than proximate cause.
Placing the focus on proximate cause and requiring the plaintiff to estab-
lish the foreseeability of the accident, in effect, requires the plaintiff to
prove that misuse was foreseeable. Thus, this shift turns the affirmative
defense of no foreseeable misuse for which the defendant bears the bur-
den, into an element of the prima facie case for which the plaintiff bears
the burden.
Two significant problems result from this burden shifting. First, by ad-
ding yet another aspect of foreseeability to the plaintiff's prima facie case,
the last brick in the wall between strict products liability and negligent
products liability crumbles. Second, shifting the burden to the plaintiff is
contrary to the law in most jurisdictions. Of the twenty-nine states that
specifically have addressed the allocation of the burden regarding fore-
seeable misuse, seventeen states follow the traditional view by placing the
burden on the defendant.' 0 8 As the most recent cases and statutes in
105. 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980).
106. Id. at 543.
107. Id. at 546.
108. The courts in the following cases have expressly held or characterized misuse as
an affirmative defense in which the defendant ordinarily bears the burden: Banner Weld-
ers, Inc. v. Knighton, 425 So. 2d 441, 448 (Ala. 1982) (holding that user's misuse constituted
a valid defense under the "'extended manufacturer's liability doctrine' " where plaintiff
sustained injuries while operating a shuttle welder); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sport-
ing Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 46-47 (Alaska 1976) (holding that the defense of comparative
negligence extends to misuse in strict liability where plaintiff sustained injuries while riding
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a snowmobile); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal. 1978) (holding
that misuse is a defense to strict liability where plaintiff sustained injuries when she was
ejected from a car during a collision); Nelson v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 694 P.2d 867, 869
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that misuse that could not reasonably be anticipated is a
valid defense to a strict products liability claim involving plaintiff's operation of a forklift);
Matthews v. F.M.C. Corp., 462 A.2d 376, 377-78 (Conn. 1983) (holding the special defense
of misuse is available in strict liability where plaintiff sustained injuries when her hand
becoming caught in a sandwich machine); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 90
(Fla. 1976) (holding that defense of misuse is available as stated in Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A where plaintiff was run over by a backward moving soil grader); McBride
v. Ford Motor Co., 673 P.2d 55, 63 (Idaho 1983) (holding that "misuse ... is an affirmative
defense to a strict liability action" where plaintiff sustained injury while operating a branch
chipping machine); Wells v. Coulter Sales, 306 N.W.2d 411, 415 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that misuse is a proper defense to a products strict liability action where plaintiff
was killed while operating a forklift); Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 37 (Neb.
1979) (holding that misuse is a valid defense to a strict liability action where a deer, and
subsequent loss of control of the vehicle, contributed to plaintiff's death when his tractor
collided with the median in the road); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 849
(N.H. 1978) (holding that product misuse is an affirmative defense to strict liability where
plaintiff was injured as a result of his foot becoming caught under a power mower); Mar-
chese v. Warner Communications, 670 P.2d 113, 116 (N.M. Ct. App.) (holding misuse or
abnormal use of the product are defenses to a strict liability action where plaintiff was
killed as a result of driving in the wrong direction at the Malibu Grand Prix race track),
cert. denied, 669 P.2d 735 (N.M. 1983); Sheppard v. Charles A. Smith Well Drilling &
Water Sys., 463 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that the defense of misuse was
adopted as stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt g, where plaintiff was
injured as a result of a trolley device snapping); Davis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 496,
497 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding that unforeseeable misuse is an affirmative defense to
be asserted by defendant manufacturer where plaintiff was injured while using a press
brake); Norman v. Fisher Marine, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 414,422 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that jury could be instructed on misuse as an affirmative defense where plaintiff was killed
as a result of being thrown from a fishing boat); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d
1301, 1302 (Utah 1981) (holding that misuse is an affirmative defense to strict liability and
should be applied according to comparative principles where plaintiff was injured as a re-
sult of standing on a mining winch); Smith v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 695 P.2d 600, 604 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that "[t]he defendant has the burden of proving misuse"); Star
Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 862 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that
misuse and comparative negligence are affirmative defenses in strict liability where plain-
tiffs property was damaged as a result of faulty wiring from a clock).
The courts in the following cases have held or recognized, either explicitly or implicitly,
that the misuse defense in strict products liability cases is not an affirmative defense for the
defendant: Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law
to hold misuse is not a separate defense but is related to issues of defectiveness and proxi-
mate cause in plaintiff's case where plaintiff suffered severe injuries as a result of an explo-
sion of a propane cylinder); Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (D.
Mont. 1981) (applying Montana law to determine conduct by the plaintiff that could in-
clude misuse must be used only to compare fault and reduce damages and not as an affirm-
ative defense where plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of an airplane crash); Amburgery
v. Holan Div. of Ohio Brass Co., 606 P.2d 21, 22 (Ariz. 1980) (holding that a plaintiff must
prove that a product was defective by showing that it was being used for its intended,
normal, and anticipated use and that the manufacturer cannot restrict liability because the
use was not within its intended use). Gallee v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 N.E.2d 831, 834
(Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that "misuse of a product is not an affirmative defense to...
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these jurisdictions indicate, the clear trend is toward keeping misuse as an
affirmative defense for the defendant to prove. 10 9
On the other hand, given the relationship between misuse and manner-
within-the-risk, keeping misuse as an affirmative defense continues to re-
quire the defendant to bear the burden regarding manner-within-the-risk
based proximate cause. 110 This is a clear break from traditional rules re-
garding proximate cause, but only when viewed from a negligence per-
spective. When viewed from a strict liability perspective, this approach
keeps the cause of action for strict products liability one (small) step from
negligence.
2. The Special Case of Intervening Cause
Situations involving intervening or superseding causes present special
problems in the products liability analysis. As developed in the negli-
gence context, an intervening cause, under certain circumstances, super-
sedes the defendant's breach of duty and relieves the defendant of
liability."' According to section 440 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, "[a] superseding cause is an act of a third person or other force
which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to
strict liability" where plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of falling from a ladder);
Hughes, 288 N.W.2d at 545 (holding that "misuse [of a product] is not an affirmative de-
fense but rather has to do with 'an element of the plaintiff's own case' "where plaintiff was
severely burned when his stove exploded); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d
348, 356 (Md. 1985) (holding that misuse is not an affirmative defense,. but is a defense
which may negate essential elements of a plaintiff's case where plaintiff was injured as a
result of her nightgown catching on fire); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377, 394
(Minn. 1977) (holding that plaintiff's conduct labeled as misuse is not an affirmative de-
fense but is part of plaintiff's case where plaintiff sustained injury as a result of a defect in
the plastic yoke of a turn-signal switch); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975) (holding that misuse is not a defense to strict liability but an element of
plaintiff's cause of action where plaintiff sustained injury when a lawnmower struck him);
Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., 345 N.W.2d 338, 347-48 (N.D. 1984) (holding that
plaintiff must prove proximate cause of injuries and that if plaintiff's injuries result from
her own actions the seller cannot be held liable under products-liability theory). Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816, 832-33 (N.J. 1978) (holding that plaintiff must prove
his conduct was not the proximate cause of his injury where plaintiff was injured by a
pelletizing machine), overruled on other grounds by Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 406 A.2d 140, 147 (N.J. 1979) (finding that employee injured while engaged at his
assigned task on plant machine is not guilty of contributory negligence even if the em-
ployee may have unreasonably and voluntarily encountered known risk).
109. See supra note 108.
110. Id.
111. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 44, at 301, 303 (explaining that "[a]n intervening
cause is one which comes into active operation in producing the result after the negligence
of the defendant"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965) (concluding that "[an
intervening force is one which actively operates in producing harm to another after the
actor's negligent act or omission has been committed").
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another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing
about."'
12
The issue then becomes under what circumstances does an intervening
cause become a superseding one. In the negligence context, this issue is
resolved by focusing on foreseeability, wherein an intervening cause re-
lieves the negligent defendant of liability only if the intervening force is
improbable or unforeseeable. Liability is not relieved if the defendant
should have foreseen the intervening cause as a natural and probable re-
sult of his negligence. 113 Conceptualized in this way, superseding cause is
just another aspect of the manner-within-the-risk category of result-
within-the-risk based proximate cause. Quite simply, the focus of the
analysis is on the way the accident happened.
Although the doctrine of superseding cause was developed in negli-
gence theory, it also has been applied in the strict products liability con-
text.' 14 While such application may be appropriate, its reliance on
foreseeability and its essential nature as a manner-within-the-risk prob-
lem require care in order to prevent the superseding cause from over-
whelming the strict liability-based products liability prima facie case.
Specifically, in the area of strict products liability, problems of supersed-
ing cause usually become manifest in situations involving misuse, altera-
tion, and modification.115 Applying the approach taken by the majority
of courts over the past few decades, foreseeability can be de-emphasized
and the cause of action for strict products liability can be preserved by
keeping the burden of proof regarding misuse, alteration, and modifica-
tion on the manufacturer.' 1 6
For example, in Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Corpora-
tion,117 the plaintiff was injured while operating an employer-owned
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965).
113. See, e.g., Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 670-71 (N.Y.
1980) (affirming a finding of liability of the defendant because the injury caused by its
negligence was a foreseeable, normal, and natural result).
114. See, e.g., Bursch v. Beardsley & Piper, 971 F.2d 108, 112 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating
that "a cause is not superseding if ... it was foreseeable by the original wrongdoer");
Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 454 N.E.2d 64, 67 (II1. App. Ct. 1983) (quoting Lewis v.
Stran Steel Co., 311 N.E.2d 128, 132 (I11. 1974), which stated that " '[t]he intervention of
independent, concurrent or intervening forces will not break the casual connection if the
intervention of such independent force was itself probable and foreseeable' "); Anderson v.
Dreis & Krump Mfg., 739 P.2d 1177, 1184 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (declaring that "[wihether
an act may be considered a superseding cause sufficient to relieve a defendant of liability
depends on whether the intervening act can reasonably be foreseen by the defendant").
115. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
116. See Zablotsky, supra note 13, at 188-90 (arguing that the effect a plaintiff's misuse
has upon proximate cause does not justify shifting the burden of denying misuse onto the
plaintiff).
117. 739 P.2d 1177 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
press, which corrugated metal. As sold by the manufacturer, the press
was designed to be activated by a two-button control system. 1 8 The but-
tons were located at shoulder level and had to be pressed simultaneously,
using both hands, to start the press.119 This system ensured that the oper-
ator's hands were safely away from the press bed. 2 ' Subsequent to re-
ceiving the press, the employer disconnected the two-button control
system and altered the press so that it could be activated by pressing a
single button attached to the end of an electrical cord.' 21 This system
allowed the operator's hands to be in the press bed at the time of activa-
tion. The plaintiff injured his hand when he accidentally leaned against
the single button activator and started the press.'2 2 The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer for design defect, and the manufacturer responded that the
employer's modification of the two-button system was the superseding
cause of the plaintiff's injuries.123
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the manu-
facturer, the Washington Court of Appeals held that: (1) "only interven-
ing acts which are not reasonably foreseeable are deemed superseding
causes;' 124 (2) a manufacturer "will not be relieved of responsibility sim-
ply because the exact manner in which the injury occurred could not be
anticipated;' 25 and (3) "reasonable persons could disagree as to whether
[the employer's] modification broke the causal chain between" the manu-
facturer's design and the plaintiff's injury.' 26
As Anderson illustrates, the best way to analyze the employer modifi-
cation issue is to distinguish between superseding cause and the manner-
within-the-risk category of result-within-the-risk based proximate cause.
In addition, the case demonstrates the importance of focusing on the
modification and maintaining the burden of proof on the defendant, as
opposed to manner-within-the-risk proximate cause, which would shift
the burden of proof to the plaintiff. If the case had merged the modifica-
tion analysis into the proximate cause analysis, it would be difficult to
distinguish the process from a proximate cause analysis for negligence.
118. Id. at 1180.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1181.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1185.
124. Id. at 1184.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1186.
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3. The Special Case of Comparative Fault
The ascendancy of the doctrine of comparative fault should dispel any
doubts over the appropriateness of relieving the plaintiff of the burden of
proving manner-within-the-risk. Comparative fault is the application of
the principles of comparative negligence to causes of action based in strict
liability.'27 As determined by either negligence or strict liability, culpable
conduct on the part of the plaintiff would reduce, by an appropriate per-
centage, the damages arising from the culpable conduct of the defend-
ant.128  In the context of strict products liability, if the plaintiff
is negligent in misusing, altering, or modifying the product, and this
negligence is in part a cause in fact of the harm suffered, the plaintiff's
conduct will result in the diminution of damages. 129 Some jurisdictions
have refused to recognize the principle of comparative fault, reasoning
that a negligent plaintiff's conduct cannot, theoretically, affect a defend-
ant's liability that is grounded in strict liability. 3 ' Other jurisdictions,
127. See VicrOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 1.6 (1974); Vargo,
supra note 104, at 460-62 (noting the recent trend of comparative fault principles in strict
liability); Henderson & TWerski, supra note 2, at 1525 (discussing the use of comparative
fault to reduce awards to plaintiffs); see also infra note 130 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the jurisdictions that do not apply comparative fault).
128. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
129. Vargo, supra note 104, at 460.
130. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-5721 (West 1991) (stating that "[i]n causes
of action based on strict tort liability, contributory negligence or comparative negligence
shall not be a bar to recovery"); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1133-34 (1st Cir.
1978) (rejecting use of comparative negligence in a strict liability action), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 916 (1979); Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976) (rejecting plaintiff's
suggestion to submit issue of comparative fault to the jury in a products liability case);
Kinard v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837-38 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that comparative
negligence has no application in a products liability case); Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715
S.W.2d 491, 492-93 (Mo. 1986) (concluding that a plaintiff's contributory negligence is not
an issue in a products liability action); Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373, 380 (Ohio
1987) (searching numerous jurisdictions and finding that comparative negligence or com-
parative fault has no application in a products liability case); Kirkland v. General Motors
Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974) (holding that comparative negligence statutes in
Oklahoma have no application in a products liability action); McCrown v. International
Harvester Co., 342 A.2d 381, 382 (Pa. 1975) (rejecting comparative assessment of damages
in strict products liability action to recover damages from an automobile manufacturer);
Staymates v. ITT Holub Indus., 527 A.2d 140, 145 (Pa. Super. 1987) (holding that compara-
tive negligence is not applicable in a strict products liability case); Seay v. Chrysler Corp.,
609 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Wash. 1980) (holding that Washington comparative negligence statute
is not applicable in a strict products liability case), superseded by WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 4.22.005, 4.22.015 (West 1988); Albrecht v. Groat, 588 P.2d 229, 231 (Wash. 1978) (hold-
ing that contributory negligence has no application in common carrier action); Bich v.
General Elec. Co., 614 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that comparative
negligence has no application in a strict liability action).
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however, have adopted either pure or modified comparative fault
systems. 131
Prior to comparative fault, there never existed any one definition of
unforeseeable misuse, but there was a consensus that unforeseeable mis-
use comprised something more severe than contributory negligence. 132
Comparative fault simply sweeps away this distinction. In the context of
strict products liability, comparative fault offers some significant advan-
tages to manufacturers, because the defense of contributorily negligent
conduct, as manifested by negligent misuse, alteration, or modification,
becomes available to the defendant. 13
3
131. See, e.g., McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1979)
(adopting comparative negligence rule in strict liability actions); Murray v. Fairbanks
Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 160-61 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that comparative negligence rule ap-
plies in strict liability actions); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 290 (5th
Cir. 1975) (finding that the trial judge instructed the jury correctly in allowing application
of comparative negligence principles in a strict liability case); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger &
Co., 498 F. Supp. 389, 393 (D. Mont. 1980) (recognizing application of comparative fault to
a strict liability action), certif. question answered, 661 P.2d 17 (Mont.), and vacated and
remanded, 709 F.2d 26 (9th Cir.), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Sun Valley Airlines
v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho 1976) (applying Idaho's compar-
ative negligence statute to strict products liability cases); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594
P,2d 38, 42 (Alaska 1979) (reversing and remanding to allow for jury consideration of
plaintiff's potential comparative negligence in products liability case), modified on other
grounds, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 890 (Alaska 1979) (applying comparative negligence in strict
products liability action); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42,
43 (Alaska 1976) (holding that comparative negligence is applicable to products liability
cases for personal injuries); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162,1172 (Cal. 1978)
(extending comparative fault to strict products liability actions); Kennedy v. City of Saw-
yer, 618 P.2d 788, 798 (Kan. 1980) (applying doctrine of comparative fault to strict liability
action); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 850 (N.H. 1978) (recognizing
comparative negligence in strict liability actions); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach.
Co., 406 A.2d 140, 147 (N.J. 1979) (holding that New Jersey Comparative Negligence Act is
applicable to strict products liability cases), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:58C-3(a)(2) (West 1987); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 597 P.2d 351, 355 (Or. 1979) (hold-
ing that an Oregon statute provides that comparative fault is applicable to strict liability
actions); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. 1977) (holding that
"[t]he defense in a products liability case, where both defect and misuse contribute to
cause the damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's recovery to that portion of his damages
equal to the percentage of the cause contributed by the product defect"); Dippel v. Sciano,
155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (Wis. 1967) (discussing in dicta that comparative negligence can be
applied in strict liability actions).
132. See Zablotsky, supra note 13, at 190-91 ("Regardless of which definition is
adopted, the concept of plaintiff misuse is broken down into at least two components-
plaintiff's conduct and manufacturer foreseeability of that conduct."); see also Ellsworth v.
Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 357 (Md. 1985) ("Momentary inattention or careless-
ness on the part of the user, while it may constitute contributory negligence, does not add
up to misuse of the product.").
133. See supra notes 127-29, 131 and accompanying text.
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Comparative fault also provides two more justifications for keeping the
burden of proving misuse, alteration, and modification, and thereby man-
ner-within-the-risk, on the manufacturer. First, the application of com-
parative fault assures that manufacturers have more foreseeability-based
protection in the strict products liability context than ever before. Sec-
ond, the adoption of comparable fault by many jurisdictions illustrates
how even traditionally and universally accepted principles, such as the
principle that a plaintiff's contributory negligence cannot operate to re-
duce strict liability-based manufacturer liability, can be set aside to fur-
ther the greater jurisprudential good. In the same way, traditional
notions of proximate cause can be re-distributed in order to salvage a
cause of action for strict products liability.
C. Type-Within-the-Risk
1. In general
The type-within-the-risk category of result-within-the-risk based proxi-
mate cause focuses on the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff. As de-
veloped in negligence and applied to an actor's conduct, the question
becomes whether the type of harm the plaintiff suffered was foreseeable
by the defendant as a result of his conduct.'34 From this perspective, Pal-
sgraf actually might satisfy a type-within-the-risk requirement: the de-
fendant's conduct was negligent, in part, precisely because it was
foreseeable that the conduct could inflict injuries that were associated
with the plaintiff being crushed.' 35
In the strict products liability context, type-within-the-risk is relevant
to manner-within-the-risk and superseding cause. This relationship grows
out of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 442, which articulates im-
portant factors in discerning whether an intervening force is a supersed-
ing cause. The section begins with an analysis of whether the intervention
has brought about a harm that is "different in kind."' 36
134. See infra notes 135-42 and accompanying text.
135. Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
136. Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965):
The following considerations are of importance in determining whether an inter-
vening force is a superseding cause of harm to another:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different in kind from that
which would otherwise have resulted from the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof appear after the
event to be extraordinary rather than normal in view of the circumstances existing
at the time of its operation;
(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situa-
tion created by the actor's negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal
result of such a situation;
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Again, Anderson illustrates the relationship between manner-within-
the-risk, superseding cause, and type-within-the-risk. By holding as a
matter of law that the employer's alteration of the press design was not a
superseding cause, the court relied on the fact that "the modification did
not result in a different type of harm than otherwise would have oc-
curred" from the manufacturer's alleged design defect.'37
Even when a type-within-the-risk argument exists, most manufacturers
have focused instead on either foreseeability as related to the risk-benefit
test or foreseeability as related to manner-within-the-risk. McCormack v.
Hankscraft Company' 38 offers a typical example of such avoidance of the
type-within-the-risk argument. In McCormack, a child was burned by hot
water when she tipped over a vaporizer.'39 The plaintiff argued that the
vaporizer, which consisted of three component parts that fit, but did not
screw together, was designed defectively because it allowed hot water to
escape when tipped over.140 The manufacturer's argued that the chosen
design was to prevent an explosion caused by excessive steam pressure
within the unit. 4 ' In risk-benefit terms, this argument translates into a
claim that the benefits of this chosen design in eliminating the risk of
explosion outweigh the risk of spilled hot water. In manner-within-the-
risk terms, the argument translates into a claim that an injury inflicted by
explosion was foreseeable, but an injury inflicted by spilling was not.
The corollary type-within-the-risk argument that abrasions inflicted by
flying glass are foreseeable but burns inflicted by spilled water are not,
however, played essentially no role in the analysis. 42 The minimization
of the type-within-the-risk argument in the strict products liability context
is neither surprising nor inappropriate. Given its relative insignificance as
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due to a third person's
act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person which is
wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the
intervening force in motion.
Id.
137. Anderson v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Corp., 739 P.2d 1177, 1186 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987).
138. 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967).
139. Id. at 493.
140. Id. at 495. Even though the plaintiff's mother realized that the vaporizer could be
tipped over by an external force, she relied upon the defendant's representations that the
unit was "safe," "practically foolproof," and "tip-proof." Id. Plaintiff's two expert wit-
nesses claimed that the vaporizer could be tipped over with little effort and that the unit's
defective design placed children at risk of physical harm should the unit be left operating
and unsupervised. Id.
141. Id. at 498..
142. Id. at 491.
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an independent analytical concept in the products liability area, type-
within-the-risk safely can be grouped with manner-within-the-risk. Con-
sequently, it remains a part of the manufacturer's burden in the misuse,
alteration, modification, or superseding cause context.
2. The Special Case of Damages for Emotional Distress
The only instance in which type-within-the-risk emerges as a separate,
significant component of the strict products liability cause of action is
when damages for emotional distress are claimed. Typically, these cases
involve food or beverage products containing foreign objects.143 The
damage claim for emotional distress is based on harm suffered when the
plaintiff perceives and is distressed by the object. The claim is distinct
from, and generally does not involve, physical harm suffered by ingestion
of the foreign object. 14
.143. See, e.g., Jasper Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Roberts, 252 So. 2d 428, 430, 432 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1971) (finding that plaintiff became ill as a result of drinking a bottle of Coca-
Cola that contained cigarette stubs, tobacco, and match sticks); Opelika Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., v. Johnson, 241 So. 2d 327, 330-31 (Ala. Civ. App.) (affirming judgment for dam-
ages resulting from plaintiff's ingestion of a beverage containing a partially decomposed
worm), cert. denied, 241 So. 2d 331 (Ala. 1970); Way v. Tampa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260
So. 2d 288, 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (adopting the rule in Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Plants, 269 A.2d 171 (Me. 1970), the court found in favor of plaintiff regarding his
claim of emotional distress after drinking a beverage containing substance that appeared to
be a hairless rat); Reine v. Baton Rouge Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 126 So. 2d 635, 636-37
(La. Ct. App. 1961) (affirming judgment in damages for injuries, including mental revul-
sion, when plaintiff drank a beverage containing a roach egg and a year later drank a soft
drink containing a toy jack); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433, 437-38
(Me. 1982) (finding that a mother could recover damages for mental distress after observ-
ing her son choke on foreign substance found in jar of baby food, although she experienced
no physical harm); Wallace, 269 A.2d at 121 (involving damages awarded for emotional
distress without requiring a showing of external trauma regarding plaintiff's consumption
of a soft drink containing an unpackaged prophylactic), overruled in part by Culbert, 444
A.2d at 436; Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 420 P.2d 855, 859 (Nev. 1966)
(finding $2,500 in damages for physical and mental distress not to be excessive when plain-
tiff consumed a soft drink containing a dead mouse); Miller v. Atlantic Bottling Corp., 191
S.E.2d 518, 520 (S.C. 1972) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient to maintain a rea-
sonable inference that plaintiff was made ill by drinking a beverage containing a "large
mass of unidentifiable foreign substance"); Wright v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 414 N.W.2d
608, 610 (S.D. 1987) (remanding case for jury trial on the issue of damages for emotional
distress resulting from plaintiff's alleged consumption of a beverage containing a decom-
posed mouse); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Plainview v. White, 545 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1976) (affirming judgment for pain and suffering when child drank beverage contain-
ing remains of a mouse).
144. In the following cases, the plaintiff claimed physical harm as well as emotional
distress: Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 241 So. 2d at 330-31; Way, 260 So. 2d at 290;
Reine, 126 So. 2d at 637; Culbert, 444 A.2d at 437; Wallace, 269 A.2d at 121; Dolinski, 420
P.2d at 859; Miller, 191 S.E.2d at 519; Wright, 414 N.W.2d at 609; White, 545 S.W.2d at 280.
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Courts are divided over whether to allow plaintiffs to recover damages
for emotional distress in this products liability context. In terms of type-
within-the-risk proximate cause, courts allowing recovery reason that
emotional distress is a foreseeable type of harm that a plaintiff will suffer
when encountering a foreign object in a consumable product. 14 5 Con-
versely, courts denying recovery reason that foreseeable types of harm
are limited to physical injuries. 146
Although emotional distress actions can involve type-within-the-risk,
no reason exists to place a type-within-the-risk proximate cause burden
on the plaintiff in the strict products liability cause of action. Rather, the
pattern of jurisdictions deciding as a matter of law that damages for emo-
tional distress are foreseeable should continue for two reasons. First,
once again, this approach avoids enhancing the role of foreseeability in
the strict products liability analysis. Second, the approach takes into ac-
count that the damages for emotional distress extend far beyond products
liability to many other causes of action in the civil system.147 Accord-
ingly, the availability of damages for emotional distress has less to do with
the impact of a defective product, and much more to do with the jurisdic-
tion's attitude toward policies regarding the appropriate scope of the
plaintiff's recovery generally.'
48
145. See, e.g., Opelika Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 241 So. 2d at 331; Way, 260 So. 2d at
290; Reine, 126 So. 2d at 637; Culbert, 444 A.2d at 438; Wallace, 269 A.2d at 121-22; Miller,
191 S.E.2d at 520; Wright, 414 N.W.2d at 610 n.3; White, 545 S.W.2d at 280.
146. See, e.g., Legac v. Vietmeyer Bros., 147 A. 110, 110-11 (N.J. 1929) (granting non-
suit to defendant when plaintiff suffered fright, but non-physical injury, after eating insect
infected bread that was purchased from defendant); Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 185 A.
744, 744-45 (Pa. 1936) (reinstating judgment for defendant upon finding that plaintiff suf-
fered no physical injury from eating soup containing an insect).
147. For example, in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968), the plaintiff brought
a wrongful death action because of the emotional distress she experienced from witnessing
a fatal accident involving her child, which was caused by defendant motorist's negligence.
Id. The court held that plaintiff's witnessing, in close proximity, the death of her child due
to defendant motorist's negligence alleged a prima facie action for emotional distress
against defendant. Id. at 921; see also Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981)
(discussing a bystander's claim for emotional distress); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a bystander may recover for emotional distress
caused by witnessing peril to a victim proximately caused by the reasonably foreseeable
negligence of another).
148. Some courts have maintained that reasonable foreseeability should not be a pri-
mary factor in evaluating emotional distress claims because it "would produce ... a risk of
liability disproportionate to the defendant's culpability.... [and] courts have ,decided not
to give full effect to reasonable foreseeability and have adopted limitations on liability,
such as the impact rule or the zone of danger rule." Dziokonski, 380 N.E.2d at 1302.
Other courts have stated that there is "no good reason why the general rules of tort law,
including the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability, long applied to
all other types of injury, should not govern" a claim of emotional distress. Dillon, 441 P.2d
at 924.
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IV. THE TREATMENT OF PROXIMATE CAUSE BY THE DRAFT
REVISIONS OF SECTION 402A
The process for revising section 402A has produced five drafts: Prelim-
inary Draft No. 1;1' 9 Council Draft No. 1;15 ° Council Draft No. 1A;151
Tentative Draft No. 1;152 and Tentative Draft No. 2.153 Either directly or
indirectly, the major proximate cause issues have been addressed in these
drafts, with decidedly mixed results.
Person-within-the-risk appears to have been minimized out of exist-
ence, for the revisions have made commercial sellers liable "to persons"
for harm caused by defective products.'54 The old distinction between
users and bystanders is no longer articulated, and this simple "to persons"
formula has not been elaborated upon in either the Comments or the
Reporters' Notes. 55 This approach comports with the view that manu-
facturers should be liable to all categories of plaintiffs, including bystand-
ers. It completes a development encouraged by original section 402A
and the great majority of authorities that have addressed the issue.' 56
While this approach does not speak in terms of the person-within-the-risk
category of result-within-the-risk based proximate cause, its inclusion of
all possible plaintiffs in a statement of liability effectively eliminates the
person-within-the-risk burden.
The text of the drafts do not directly deal with manner-within-the-risk
and type-within-the-risk. These concepts, however, obviously are af-
fected by general language in Tentative Draft No. 2, Section 10. In a
section entitled "Causal Connection Between Product Defect and
Harm," Tentative Draft No. 2 states: "Whether a product defect caused
harm is determined by the prevailing rules and principles governing cau-
The California Supreme Court rejected the contention "that to allow recovery in the
absence of physical injury will open the door to unfounded claims and a flood of litigation,
and that the requirement that there be physical injury is necessary to insure that serious
mental suffering actually occurred." State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d
282, 286 (Cal. 1952). Furthermore, "[tihe jury is ordinarily in a better position, however, to
determine whether outrageous conduct results in mental distress than whether that distress
in turn results in physical injury." Id.
149. Preliminary Draft, supra note 3.
150. Council Draft No. 1, supra note 3.
151. Council Draft No. 1A, supra note 3.
152. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 3.
153. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 3.
154. Preliminary Draft, supra note 3, at 7.
155. See generally id. at 10-96; Tentative Draft, supra note 3, at 1-9.
156. See supra notes 63-77 and accompanying text
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sation in tort." '157 This language has been carried forward through all five
drafts.158
While this language sounds neutral and straightforward, the Comments
and Reporters Notes, however, advocate that product misuse, alteration,
and modification should be treated as an aspect of proximate cause. By
stating that "product misuse and alteration may be treated as an aspect of
proximate causation, 159 the Comments to Council Draft No. 1 indicate
that the burden of misuse, alteration, and modification should be shifted
to the plaintiff. The Comments then quote the minority view as articu-
lated by Hughes.6 ' Tentative Draft No. 2 relegates the discussion of
Hughes to the Reporters' Notes,'161 but includes in a Comment an illus-
tration that treats modification as an aspect of proximate cause.162 Thus,
similarly neutral sounding language combines to urge a shift to the minor-
ity view regarding burden of proof and proximate cause.
The proposed language would make foreseeability a prominent compo-
nent of the strict products liability analysis, thereby transforming strict
products liability into a negligence cause of action. Future courts should
resist the Restatement's push toward this approach. Rather, they should
continue to apply the majority view and maintain the burden of proof on
the manufacturer regarding misuse, alteration, and modification, and
thereby manner-and-type-within-the-risk.
163
V. CONCLUSION
The legal debate may continue indefinitely, but the revision process for
section 402A will not. In the relatively near future, the impact of the
revised section 402A will be substantial and it will be a most important
point of reference. It is vital that section 402A preserve a products liabil-
ity cause of action based in strict liability. Resolving the extent to which
proximate cause is integrated into the strict products liability analysis is
thus critical, particularly as proximate cause relates to misuse and man-
ner-within-the-risk.
The authorities cited demonstrate that proximate cause can be elimi-
nated as a separately-articulated element of the strict products liability
cause of action. While a failure to articulate proximate cause may appear
157. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 3, at 260.
158. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 3, at 125; Council Draft No. 1, supra note 3, at
155; Council Draft No. 1A, supra note 3, at 75; Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 3, at 105.
159. Council Draft No. 1, supra note 3, at 162.
160. Id. at 162-63.
161. Tentative Draft No. 2, supra note 3, at 265-66.
162. Id. at 262-63.
163. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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to disregard fundamental notions of United States jurisprudence, ulti-
mately, this is not the case because foreseeability concerns are inherent to
other elements of the cause of action. Thus, person-within-the-risk con-
siderations are addressed in the cause of action component dealing with
who may bring suit. Manner-within-the-risk concerns are addressed in
the cause of action component dealing with misuse and cause in fact.
Type-within-the-risk concerns are addressed in the cause of action com-
ponent dealing with defect and cause in fact. Articulating how these
other components have assumed the responsibility normally borne by the
proximate cause doctrine should leave us with an appropriate strict prod-
ucts liability cause of action that is effective and straightforward.
Dealing with proximate cause in this way offers the best, and perhaps
only, way of maintaining the wall between strict products liability and
negligence. It also assists in accurately restating the current law and,
therefore, achieves the paramount goal of any restatement.

